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Eﬀectiveness of battleﬁeld-ethics training during combat
deployment: a programme assessment
Christopher H Warner, George N Appenzeller, Angela Mobbs, Jessica R Parker, Carolynn M Warner, Thomas Grieger, Charles W Hoge

Summary
Background Breakdowns in the ethical conduct of soldiers towards non-combatants on the battleﬁeld are of grave
concern in war. Evidence-based training approaches to prevent unethical conduct are scarce. We assessed the
eﬀectiveness of battleﬁeld-ethics training and factors associated with unethical battleﬁeld conduct.
Methods The training package, based on movie vignettes and leader-led discussions, was administered 7 to 8 months
into a 15-month high-intensity combat deployment in Iraq, between Dec 11, 2007, and Jan 30, 2008. Soldiers from an
infantry brigade combat team (total population about 3500) were randomly selected, on the basis of company and the
last four digits of each soldier’s social security number, and invited to complete an anonymous survey 3 months after
completion of the training. Reports of unethical behaviour and attitudes in this sample were compared with a
randomly selected pre-training sample from the same brigade. The response patterns for ethical behaviour and
reporting of ethical violations were analysed with chi-square analyses. We developed two logistic regression models
using self-reported unethical behaviours as dependent variables. Factors associated with unethical conduct, including
combat experiences and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), were assessed with validated scales.
Findings Of 500 randomly selected soldiers 421 agreed to participate in the anonymous post-training survey. A total of
397 soldiers of the same brigade completed the pre-training survey. Training was associated with signiﬁcantly lower
rates of unethical conduct of soldiers and greater willingness to report and address misconduct than in those before
training. For example, reports of unnecessary damage or destruction of private property decreased from 13·6%
(54 of 397; 95% CI 10·2–17·0) before training to 5·0% (21 of 421; 2·9–7·1) after training (percent diﬀerence –63·2%;
p<0·0001), and willingness to report a unit member for mistreatment of a non-combatant increased from 36·0%
(143 of 397; 31·3–40·7) to 58·9% (248 of 421; 54·2–63·6; percent diﬀerence 63·6; p<0·0001). Nearly all participants
(410 [97%]) reported that training made it clear how to respond towards non-combatants. Combat frequency and
intensity was the strongest predictor of unethical behaviour; PTSD was not a signiﬁcant predictor of unethical
behaviour after controlling for combat experiences.
Interpretation Leader-led battleﬁeld ethics training positively inﬂuenced soldiers’ understanding of how to interact
with and treat non-combatants, and reduced reports of ethical misconduct. Unethical battleﬁeld conduct was
associated with high-intensity combat but not with PTSD.
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Introduction
The ethical conduct of US military service members
engaged in combat operations in Iraq or Afghanistan
came to the forefront of public attention with the events of
Abu Ghraib (2004), Haditha (2006), and other highly
publicised cases.1,2 In some of these cases, including recent
allegations of murder of non-combatants by a sniper team
in Iraq and a group of soldiers in a Stryker unit, unethical
conduct has been attributed to the stresses of combat or
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).3,4 Unethical conduct
has been a concern in previous wars.
In 2006, ethical issues were included for the ﬁrst time
in the annual theatre-wide Mental Health Assessment
Team (MHAT) survey of the wellbeing of US soldiers
deployed in Iraq.5 The survey speciﬁcally addressed the
issue of battleﬁeld ethics and the adequacy of battleﬁeldethics training in the preparation of soldiers for combat
operations in Iraq. The 2006 MHAT survey showed that
less than 50% of soldiers were willing to report a member
www.thelancet.com Vol 378 September 3, 2011

of their unit for ethical violations, 13% reported damaging a non-combatant’s personal property, and 6% reported hitting or kicking non-combatants unnecessarily
(table 1).5 Additionally, soldiers with high levels of combat
exposure or who met criteria for PTSD reported high
levels of unethical conduct, although a systematic
statistical analysis of factors associated with ethical
misconduct was not reported.5
The ﬁndings of the MHAT survey led to a recommendation for the development of a battleﬁeld-ethics
training programme. However, at the time of the next
MHAT survey in mid 2007, no systematic training
programme had been developed, and the 2007 MHAT
assessment showed levels of unethical conduct similar to
that reported in the 2006 survey (table 1).6
The unchanged levels of unethical conduct reported in
the 2007 MHAT survey prompted the Commanding
General of the Multi-National Division–Center in Iraq to
develop and implement a battleﬁeld-ethics training
This article is a U.S. government work, and is not subject to copyright in the United States.

915

Articles

MHAT 20065 (N=1320)

MHAT 20076 (N=2195)

Insulted and/or cursed non-combatants in their presence

490 (37%)

740 (34%)

Damaged and/or destroyed private property when it was not necessary

173 (13% )

312 (14%)

77 (6%)

138 (6%)

Members of my unit “modify” the Rules of Engagement in order to accomplish the mission

143 (11%)

171 (8%)

Members of my unit “ignore” the Rules of Engagement in order to accomplish the mission

79 (6%)

99 (5%)

Unethical behaviours*

Physically hit/kicked a non-combatant when it was not necessary

Reporting of ethical violations†
I would report a unit member for the mistreatment of a non-combatant

478 (36%)

738 (34%)

I would report a unit member for injuring or killing an innocent non-combatant

581 (44%)

891 (41%)

I would report a unit member for unnecessarily destroying private property

411 (31%)

656 (30%)

I would report a unit member for stealing from a non-combatant

499 (38%)

748 (34%)

I would report a unit member for violating the Rules of Engagement

479 (36%)

777 (35%)

I would report a unit member for not following General Orders

483 (37%)

764 (35%)

Data are number (%). MHAT=Mental Health Assessment Team. *Unethical behaviours that occurred one or more times were reported. †Willingness to report ethical
violations were assessed by reporting whether soldiers agreed or strongly agreed with each statement.

Table 1: Unethical behaviours and willingness to report ethical violations among soldiers deployed to Iraq, according to US army Mental Health
Assessment Team reports

programme for all soldiers under his command. In
response to the Commander’s directive, a training
development team was created, which was led by the
Division Psychiatrist with representatives for the Staﬀ
Judge Advocate (legal), Division Surgeon (medical),
Adjutant (personnel), and Chaplain. During the training
development, experts in the specialties of both military
and civilian ethics training were consulted.
The team did a review of military and medical reports
and publications about ethical training, international
humanitarian law, civilian protection in war, and combat
stress behaviours. Many reports discussed the
importance of ethical behaviour on the battleﬁeld, the
eﬀect of violations, and the inﬂuence of group
conformity and obedience on decision making in ethical
dilemmas.7–15 One report13 cited a need for systematic
training, noting that it should be a continuing process,
and suggested that training should focus on enhancing
moral reasoning and judgment and instilling particular
values (eg, integrity, professionalism, responsibility).
Reports preferentially focused on treatment of prisoners
of war, ethical issues related to the provision of medical
care, or scenarios with high ambiguity for which one
could make strong arguments both for or against
particular decisions (eg, whether to shoot an innocent
child or risk the child revealing the location of soldiers
on a secret mission behind enemy lines).14,15 However,
few studies presented models for eﬀective education
with routine scenarios involving non-combatants
encountered by soldiers on a day-to-day basis, and no
speciﬁc outcome measures existed that were relevant to
current operations in Iraq or Afghanistan until the
publication of the MHAT survey results. Additionally,
data about factors associated with battleﬁeld ethical
violations were scarce, which might inform
training eﬀorts.
916

This review led to the development and implementation
of a practical, scenario-based, battleﬁeld-ethics training
programme for use in theatre. We aimed to assess the
eﬀectiveness of the battleﬁeld-ethics training programme,
and to establish whether a change occurred in soldiers’
reports of how they treated non-combatants, attitudes
towards unethical conduct, and their willingness to
report ethical violations. We also assessed the association
of PTSD, combat exposure, and other variables with
unethical conduct on the battleﬁeld.

Methods
Study design and participants
The training programme was developed in October, 2007,
and implemented between Dec 11, 2007, and Jan 30, 2008.
We compared the answers from anonymous cross-sectional
surveys done before and after battleﬁeld-ethics training in
randomly selected soldiers from one brigade combat team
during a 15-month deployment to Iraq (total brigade
population about 3500). The pre-training survey included
all respondents from the brigade who had participated in
the annual theatre-wide MHAT survey in August, 2007,
about 3–4 months into a 15-month deployment and before
the training was undertaken. Training was given
7–8 months into the deployment, and then the second
cross-sectional survey was administered by the study
investigators 3–4 months after the training with the same
methods used in the 2007 MHAT survey. In addition to the
MHAT questions, we included questions to assess the
training and factors associated with unethical conduct. To
ensure comparable 3-month observation periods, survey
questions asked before training referred to behaviours
occurring since the beginning of deployment. Questions
asked after training referred to behaviours in the most
recent 3 months of the deployment. Permission to
undertake this study was obtained from the in-theatre
www.thelancet.com Vol 378 September 3, 2011
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Panel 1: Overview of the in-theatre battleﬁeld-ethics training programme
Summary
• Task: conduct battleﬁeld-ethics training.
• Format: video or slide directed discussion in a leader-led
chain-teaching format.
• Purpose: to promote adherence, protect against
unnecessary suﬀering and collateral damage, and to
promote the humane treatment of non-combatants.
• Conditions: leaders are provided with a training disc with
slides and videos and a script of key talking points to discuss
in each section. Total training time is 60–90 min.
Introduction
• During this section the leader covers the key points of the
Army Values, basic principles of the Law of War, the Soldier
Rules, and the indicators of potential misconduct. The
leader also reviews the key data about battleﬁeld ethical
behaviour from the studies done by the Mental Health
Assessment Team.
Treatment of non-combatants
• Scene (movie clip: Platoon; start 47 min 20 s, length
2 min 45 s): unit searching a village immediately following
a signiﬁcant enemy engagement.
• Key discussion items: coping with stress, balancing excessive
versus prudent force, Rules of Engagement, and preventing
maladaptive stress induced responses.
• Warning signs discussed included cursing, destroying
property for no reason, or killing of animals.
Looting, pillaging, and treatment of wounded
• Scene (movie clip: Patriot; start 26 min 20 s, length
3 min 40 s): depicts a civilian providing aid and assistance to
soldiers from both sides.
• Key discussion items: soldiers might feel they earned the
right to loot and pillage, or commanders might do this to
instil fear; however, these short-term gains have long-term
consequences and violate the Law of War. The Geneva
Conventions make clear that enemies wounded in action
are no longer enemy combatants and should be provided
medical care.
Killing non-combatants
• Scene 1 (movie clip: Platoon; start 50 min: 22 s,
length 2 min 15 s): rage attack against villagers.

Institutional Review Board (IRB), which included
monitoring and approval both from senior medical
researchers in-theatre, and the IRB at Brooke Army
Medical Center, San Antonio, TX, USA, that was
responsible for oversight of in-theatre medical research.

Procedures
The battleﬁeld-ethics training team conferred with the
US Army Judge Advocate General Center and School, the
Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, and several
civilian experts in ethics, and chose to expand on the
www.thelancet.com Vol 378 September 3, 2011

• Scene 2 (movie clip: Black Hawk Down; start 61 min 35 s,
length 25 s): determining if a child is an enemy combatant.
• Key discussion items: in most instances, the killing of
non-combatants is clearly wrong and illegal and must be
dealt with through the military judicial system, it hurts the
mission and the unit. However, in some instances substantial
ambiguity exists. Determining if a child or adolescent is a
non-combatant can sometime be diﬃcult. Focus is on
identiﬁcation of non-combatants versus enemy combatants.
Rules of Engagement
• Scene (movie clip: Three Kings; start 0 min 55 s, length
1 min 7 s): soldiers are being indecisive about how to
engage and interact with possible enemy combatants.
• Key discussion items: soldiers always have the innate right
to protect themselves; however, the Rules of Engagement
provide guidelines for soldiers’ actions. Failure to follow the
rules could place the mission at risk. Emphasis is placed on
understanding the current Rules of Engagement for the
operational theatre.
Reporting ethical violations
• Scene (movie clip: Home of the Brave; start 11 min 45 s,
length 2 min): soldiers are involved in a continuing urban
battle where a civilian is wounded and killed in the fog of war.
• Key discussion items: data about soldiers’ willingness to
report potential violations and attitudes towards
investigations; the importance of soldiers’ understanding
that investigations after combat incidents are not just
about determining wrong-doing but are also about
providing reassurance that the proper steps and actions are
taken, and garnering the lessons that can be learned.
Warning signs and protective factors
• Warning signs and associated factors contributing toward
unethical behaviour: use of drugs and alcohol, high combat
exposure, unaddressed mental health problems, poor
equal-opportunity climate, failure of expected support,
poor unit cohesion, low conﬁdence in unit leadership.
• Protective factors: leadership, high unit cohesion, early
recognition and addressing of combat operational stress,
sleep, rest and reﬁt, eﬀective communication, after-action
debrieﬁng.

foundation of Law of War (including the Geneva
Conventions) and the current US Army Values through
structured discussions of speciﬁc movie vignettes
involving ethical dilemmas.16,17 The focus of the training
related to concerns identiﬁed in the MHAT surveys or
serious violations that had come to media attention (eg,
treatment of non-combatants, looting and pillaging,
killing non-combatants, Rules of Engagement, and
willingness to report ethical violations).5,6
In the 2007 MHAT focus groups, many soldiers
reported a desire to hear from those who had previously
917
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deployed and from their unit leaders about how they
should handle ethical dilemmas.6 Furthermore, many
soldiers reported that they did not ﬁnd behavioural
training with “typical powerpoint brieﬁngs” eﬀective.6
Consequently, the training that was developed consisted
of a leader-led interactive programme with brief video
vignettes to highlight key learning points and serve as
starting points for discussions. A military legal review
permitted the use of clips from popular movies for this
educational purpose, and unit commanders approved
the content.
The division implemented a chain-teaching format in
which senior leaders taught their immediate subordinate
leaders. The subordinate leaders then taught their own
subordinate leaders until the training involved all military
personnel. Training sessions were done in small groups
to promote discussion among those who served in
combat together. To ensure that the training was
standardised throughout, unit leaders were provided
with a script that included key questions and discussion
points for each video vignette. The leaders were
encouraged to link these discussions to current situations
and issues that the unit was facing. An overview of the
training programme is provided in panel 1.
For the pre-training comparison sample, 397 soldiers
were identiﬁed as belonging to the study brigade from a
total of 2195 who completed MHAT surveys in brigades
throughout theatre. These soldiers were identiﬁed on the
basis of unit identiﬁers in the otherwise anonymous
MHAT survey database.6 This dataset, gathered 3–4 months
into the brigade’s deployment, contained only the
responses to demographic, combat exposure, and
battleﬁeld-ethics questions from the larger MHAT survey.
The sampling methods of the 2007 MHAT survey have
been described previously.6 Brieﬂy, 25 soldiers from
randomly selected line and support companies within
brigade combat teams throughout Iraq were selected.
Although most of the MHAT data gathered in Iraq
allowed for convenience sampling in randomly selected
companies, a random method of soldier selection in each
of the selected companies was used in the brigade chosen
for this study, on the basis of the last four digits of each
soldier’s social security number. Soldiers who were
approached for participation in the MHAT survey were
informed of the voluntary and anonymous nature of the
survey, which was administered according to a protocol
approved by the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research
institutional review board.6
For the recruitment of participants to the post-training
sample, which was done with a protocol approved by the
in-theatre institutional review board, 500 soldiers were
randomly selected from the same brigade that participated
in the 2007 MHAT study with the same random selection
methods. Speciﬁcally, 25 soldiers were selected from
each Alpha, Bravo, Charlie, and Delta companies of the
ﬁve subordinate battalions within the brigade, for a total
of 500. All soldiers for whom the last four numbers of
918

their social security numbers began with 3, 6, or 9 had
their names placed on individual cards in a container
with no identiﬁers visible and 25 were drawn from the
container. Once identiﬁed, the selected soldiers were
approached by the unit’s medical provider and invited to
complete an anonymous paper survey. Soldiers were
informed that participation was voluntary, would remain
anonymous, and that their participation or nonparticipation would have no negative eﬀect on them. To
ensure the anonymity of participants in the study, no
personal identifying information was collected on the
survey and the completed surveys were placed in a sealed
envelope and locked drop box at the medical aid station,
which was accessible only by the investigators. Because
this survey was anonymous, a requirement for signed
consent was waived, and completion of the survey was
classed as consent.
Both surveys, done before and after battleﬁeld-ethics
training, included the same questions related to ethical
behaviour and reporting of ethical violations, combat
exposure, and demographic information (age, rank, sex,
education, deployment history, time spent outside the
forward operating base).5,6 The PTSD checklist-military
(PCL-M) 17 and the patient health questionnaire (PHQ) 9,
which have been validated and widely used in military and
veteran populations, were used to assess for PTSD and
depression in the soldiers who completed the survey after
training.18–21 Additionally, nine statements about soldiers’
attitudes towards the battleﬁeld-ethics chain-teaching
programme were included in the post-training survey.
The combat exposure section included 15 statements in
which respondents were asked how many times a series
of combat events occurred during deployment, with a
ﬁve-point response from 1 (never) to 5 (10 times or more)
for each event. The sections on ethical behaviours and
reporting of ethical violations included a subset of the
questions from the 2007 MHAT survey in which
respondents were asked to rate seven questions, on a
ﬁve-point scale from 1 (never) to 5 (ﬁve times or more),
about how often they engaged in a speciﬁc unethical
behaviour in the past 90 days. Additionally, the soldiers
were asked to rate how much they disagree or agree with
an additional 11 statements about attitudes toward
reporting ethical violations on a ﬁve-point scale from 1
(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Questions related
to ethical conduct focused on attitudes and speciﬁc
behaviours that were somewhat subjective (ie, insulting
non-combatants, damaging property, or hitting or kicking
a non-combatant “when it was not necessary”), to
encourage honest reporting on the anonymous surveys,
as had been done in previous MHAT surveys.
The PCL-M is a 17-item self-report checklist, directly
adapted from the PTSD criteria in the Diagnostic and
Statisical Manual IV. The checklist is keyed speciﬁcally
to stressful military experiences. Soldiers were asked to
rate how much they have been bothered in the past
month by various experiences on a ﬁve-point scale
www.thelancet.com Vol 378 September 3, 2011

Articles

ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely). Scoring was
accomplished by summing the responses of each
question with the total score ranging from 17 to 85. The
PCL-M has been validated and widely used in military
populations, and a score of 50 or greater has been
deemed optimum for the identiﬁcation of PTSD in
population-level research.18,19
The PHQ 9 is a nine item, self-administered version of
the depression module of the primary care evaluation of
mental disorders.20 This test assesses the nine diagnostic
criteria for depression on a scale 0 (not at all) to 3 (nearly
every day) and is used widely in the military.21 When the
test is used for screening, the individual responses are
summed (scale range 0–34). Scores of 5, 10, 15, and 20
have high reliability and validity for mild, moderate,
moderately severe, and severe depression, and a cutoﬀ of
10 was selected for this study.20

Statistical analyses
All data were entered into an SPSS (version 12.02)
database. The primary focus was on descriptive statistics
including the reported rates of ethical behaviours among
soldiers, willingness to report ethical violations, prevalence
of probable PTSD on the basis of the established cutoﬀ
scores on the PCL-M, prevalence of depressive symptoms
on the basis of the PHQ 9, and number of combat
exposures. Pre-training and post-training survey
responses were compared using chi-square analyses.
We developed two logistic regression models using
self-reported unethical behaviours as dependent variables,
including soldiers’ participation in insulting or cursing at
non-combatants and mistreatment of non-combatants
(deﬁned as either unnecessary damage or destruction of
non-combatant property or unnecessarily hitting or
kicking non-combatants). The independent variables that
were assessed included age (less than 25 vs 25 years or
older), sex, rank, completion of previous combat
deployments (any vs none), highest level of education,
current symptoms suggestive of depression or PTSD,
time spent outside the forward operating base (greater
than 20 h per week versus 20 h or less per week), and a
sum of combat exposures. Both individual associations
between dependent and independent variables and
adjusted associations were assessed.

Role of the funding source
No industry grants or ﬁnancial support were used in this
project. Study design, data collection, data analysis, data
interpretation, and writing of the report were completed
entirely by the study investigators and they had full access
to all data in the study. The corresponding author had full
access to all data in the study and had ﬁnal responsibility
to submit for publication.

Results
The training was completed in all brigades under the
Multi-National Division—Center Iraq, including about
www.thelancet.com Vol 378 September 3, 2011

Before
battleﬁeld-ethics
training (N=397)

After
battleﬁeld-ethics
training (N=421)

Chi square
(degrees of
freedom=1)

p value

Sex
Female
Male

49 (12%)

61 (14%)

0·635

0·43

348 (88%)

360 (86%)

0·635

0·43

Age (years)
17–25

183 (46%)

173 (41%)

1·882

0·17

≥26

214 (54%)

248 (59%)

1·882

0·17

0

191 (48%)

216 (51%)

0·712

0·40

1

132 (33%)

125 (30%)

1·041

0·31

≥2

74 (19%)

80 (19%)

0·002

0·96

E1–E4*

230 (58%)

218 (52%)

2·879

0·09

E5–E9†

143 (36%)

167 (40%)

1·005

0·32

24 (6%)

36 (8%)

1·537

0·22

Prior deployment history

Rank

Oﬃcers or Warrant Oﬃcers
Education
GED or high school

NA

192 (46%)

NA

NA

Some college

NA

170 (40%)

NA

NA

College graduate

NA

59 (14%)

NA

NA

92 (22%)

1·776

0·18

Mental health
PTSD or depression

71 (18%)

Combat exposures
Being attacked or ambushed

199 (50%)

213 (51%)

0·004

0·95

Small arms ﬁre

146 (37%)

163 (39%)

0·250

0·62

Saw dead bodies or human remains

129 (33%)

170 (40%)

5·145

0·02

87 (22%)

100 (24%)

0·294

0·26

Witnessing violence

101 (25%)

131 (31%)

2·966

0·09

Seeing dead Americans

114 (29%)

157 (37%)

6·403

0·01

Knowing someone seriously injured 207 (52%)
or killed

249 (59%)

3·784

0·05

Handling human remains

IED exploded nearby

113 (29%)

141 (34%)

2·184

0·14

Hostile reactions from civilians

122 (31%)

128 (30%)

0·001

0·98

Threatened and unable to respond

118 (30%)

95 (23%)

5·070

0·02

75 (19%)

109 (26%)

5·347

0·02

109 (28%)

114 (27%)

0·002

0·96

Shooting or ﬁring
Clearing or searching homes or
buildings
Being wounded or injured

23 (6%)

31 (7%)

0·582

0·45

Seeing ill or wounded women
or children

77 (19%)

91 (22%)

0·488

0·45

Encountering sniper ﬁre

61 (15%)

83 (20%)

2·374

0·12

139 (33%)

2·479

0·12

Time outside of the forward operating base
≥20 h

153 (39%)

Data are number (%). NA=not available. GED=general equivalency diploma. PTSD=post-traumatic stress disorder.
IED=improvised explosive device. *These ranks included Private (recruit; E1), Private (E2), Private First Class (E3), and
Specialist or Corporal (E4). †These ranks include Sergeant (E5), Staﬀ Sergeant (E6), Sergeant First Class (E7), Master
Sergeant or First Sergeant (E8), Sergeant Major, or Command Sergeant Major (E9).

Table 2: Demographics and combat experiences in soldiers before and after training

3500 soldiers in the brigade combat team selected for
this study. Of these soldiers, 500 were randomly selected
to participate in the post-training survey, and
421 (84%) voluntarily chose to participate. The sample
included mostly male enlisted soldiers, who were on
919
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Percent
diﬀerence

p value
Chi square
(degrees of
freedom=1)

Number before training
(%; 95% CI)*

Number after training
(%; 95% CI)†

The training I received in the proper (ethical) treatment of non-combatants was adequate

287 (72·3%; 67·9–76·7)

399 (94·8%; 92·6–97·0%)

31·1

74·67

<0·0001

I encountered ethical situations in which I didn’t know how to respond

119 (30·0%; 25·5–34·5)

47 (11·2%; 8·2–14·2%)

–62·7

43·54

<0·0001

I received training that made it clear how I should behave towards non-combatants

295 (74·%; 70·0–78·6)

410 (97·4%; 95·9–98·9%)

31·1

89·49

<0·0001

118 (29·7%; 25·2–34·2)

Questions on perceived adequacy of training (agree or strongly agree)

Actual behaviours and experiences during deployment (one or more times)
Insulted and/or cursed non-combatants in their presence

87 (20·7%; 16·8–24·5%)

–30·3

8·45

0·004

Damaged and/or destroyed private property when it was not necessary

54 (13·6%; 10·2–17·0)

21 (5·0%; 2·9–7·1%)

–63·2

17·19

<0·0001

Physically hit/kicked a non-combatant when it was not necessary

24 (6·1%; 3·7–8·4)

14 (3·3%; 1·6–5·0%)

–45·9

2·82

0·093

Witnessed the brutality/mistreatment of a non-combatant by a unit member

34 (8·6%; 5·8–11·3)

12 (2·9%; 1·3–4·4%)

–66·2

11·52

0·0007
0·152

Stopped a fellow unit member from mistreating a non-combatant

20 (5·0%; 2·9–7·2)

12 (2·9%; 1·3–4·4%)

–42·0

2·05

Members of my unit “modify” the Rules of Engagement to accomplish the mission

26 (6·6%; 4·1–9·0)

19 (4·5%; 2·5–6·5%)

–31·8

1·26

0·261

Members of my unit “ignore” the Rules of Engagement to accomplish the mission

13 (3%; 1·5–5·0)

11 (2·6%; 1·1–4·1%)

–21·2

0·13

0·724

Attitudes toward ethical conduct (agree or strongly agree)
I would report a unit member for the mistreatment of a non-combatant

143 (36·0%; 31·3–40·7)

248 (58·9%; 54·2–63·6%)

63·6

41·98

<0·0001

I would report a unit member for injuring or killing an innocent non-combatant

165 (41·6%; 36·7– 46·4)

271 (64·4%; 59·8–68·9%)

54·8

41·79

<0·0001

I would report a unit member for unnecessarily destroying private property

131 (33·0%; 28·4–37·6)

250 (59·4%; 54·7–64·1%)

80·0

56·11

<0·0001

I would report a unit member for stealing from a non-combatant

146 (36·8%; 32·0–41·5)

259 (61·6%; 56·9–66·2%)

67·4

49·06

<0·0001

I would report a unit member for violating the Rules of Engagement

148 (37·3%; 32·5–42·0)

261 (62·0%; 57·4–66·6%)

66·2

48·94

<0·0001

I would report a unit member for not following General Orders

156 (39·3%; 34·5–44·1)

256 (60·8%; 56·2–65·4%)

54·7

36·97

<0·0001

Torture should be allowed if it will save the life of a soldier

154 (38·8%; 34·0–43·6)

115 (27·3%; 23·1–31·6%)

–29·6

11·68

0·0006

Torture should be allowed to gather important information about insurgents

135 (34·0%; 29·4–38·7)

96 (22·8%; 18·8–26·8%)

–32·9

12·11

0·0005

Data are number (%; 95% CI) unless stated otherwise. *N=397. †N=421.

Table 3: Association of battleﬁeld-ethics training with ethical attitudes and behaviours of soldiers

their ﬁrst combat deployment (table 2). Most (404 [96%])
acknowledged completing the unit battleﬁeld-ethics
training programme, which was consistent with training
logs kept by the brigade that showed 100% compliance
with the training requirement. More than half reported
that they had either been attacked or ambushed or knew
someone who had been injured or killed in Iraq (table 2).
Chi-square analyses showed that the pre-training and
post-training groups had comparable demographics,
mental health concerns, and time outside the forward
operating base. The post-training group had higher levels
of several combat experiences than did the pre-training
group, which was an expected ﬁnding.
More than a ﬁfth of post-training survey respondents
met screening criteria for depression or PTSD, which
was comparable to the prevalence in the pre-training
sample (table 2). 42 (10%) soldiers met screening criteria
for PTSD as deﬁned by a PCL-M score of 50 or higher,
while 79 (19%) had symptoms of depression as deﬁned
by a PHQ-9 score of 10 or higher. The mean PCL-M score
was 28·6 (SD 14·0, 95% CI 27·3–29·9) and the mean
PHQ 9 score was 4·8 (SD 5·6, 95% CI 4·2–5·4). A third
of participants reported that they spent more than 20 h
per week outside the forward operating base, which was
comparable to that before training (table 2).
Most soldiers who completed the post-training survey
reported some form of combat exposure (367 [87%]), with
920

the overall sample averaging 11·8 (SD 12·3, 95% CI
10·5–13·1) exposures on a scale of 0–45 exposures. Nearly
all of those who spent more than 20 h per week outside
the forward operating base reported combat exposure
(134 [96%]), and many of those who spent most of their
time on the forward operating base also reported combat
exposures (233 [83%]). However, we identiﬁed a notable
diﬀerence in the mean number of combat exposures per
soldier between those who spent more than 20 h per week
outside the base camp (19·1 [SD 14·3, 95% CI 16·7–21·5])
and the other soldiers (8·2 [9·3, 7·1–9·3). All but one of
the soldiers who met screening criteria for PTSD reported
combat exposures during deployment.
Table 3 compares the ethical attitudes and behaviours
reported by soldiers 3–4 months after training completion
and those reported before training (which referred to the
3–4 month period from the beginning of the deployment).
Signiﬁcant increases were seen in soldiers’ perceptions of
their preparedness for encountering non-combatants
(table 3). Decreased rates of unethical conduct were noted
in all categories after training, with signiﬁcant reductions
in reports of insulting or cursing at non-combatants,
unnecessary damage or destruction of private property, or
witnessing mistreatment by a fellow unit member.
Signiﬁcant reductions were seen in all categories of
attitudes related to reporting of a fellow soldier for ethical
misconduct (table 3).
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Insulted or cursed at non-combatants
n (%)

Unadjusted

Damaged or destroyed property or hit or kicked a
non-combatant when it was not necessary
Adjusted*

n (%)

Unadjusted

p value

Adjusted*

Odds ratio p value

Odds ratio

Odds ratio

p value

Odds ratio p value

Depression (PHQ 9 ≥10)

25 (28·7%)

2·09

0·008

1·47

0·285

12 (42·9%)

3·65

0·001

2·88

0·051

PTSD (PCL-M ≥50)

18 (20·7%)

3·37

<0·0001

1·64

0·277

8 (28·6%)

4·22

0·002

1·00

0·994

>20 h outside the
forward operating base

46 (52·9%)

2·87

<0·0001

1·45

0·201

16 (57·1%)

2·89

0·007

1·11

0·832

Combat exposure
(continuous variable)

84 (96·6%)

1·068

<0·0001

1·06

<0·0001

28 (100·0%)

1·08

0·000

1·07

<0·0001

PHQ 9=patient health questionnaire 9. PTSD=post-traumatic stress disorder. PCL-M=PTSD checklist-military. *Adjusted analyses included depression, PTSD, time working
outside the forward operating base, combat exposure, and demographics (age, sex, prior deployment, rank, and education).

Table 4: Association of mental health problems, time working outside the forward operating base, and combat exposure with unethical behaviours

Disagree or strongly disagree
16 (3·8%)

Neutral

Agree or strongly agree

151 (35·9%)

The teaching made clear the impact unethical behaviours can have on the mission

254 (60·3%)
18 (4·3%)

159 (37·8%)

The teaching made clear the impact unethical behaviours can have on a unit

244 (58·0%)
21 (5·0%)

183 (43·5%)
217 (51·5%)

Chain teaching is an eﬀective way to teach ethics
28 (6·7%)

163 (38·7%)

The movie clips helped me have a better understanding of the topics being discussed

230 (54·6%)
26 (6·2%)

175 (41·6%)
220 (52·3%)

The training used good examples
28 (6·7%)

147 (34·9%)

The training gave the impression that all soldiers are committing ethical violations

246 (58·4%)
26 (6·2%)

162 (38·5%)

It was helpful for me to hear my leader’s thoughts about the ethical problems soldiers face

233 (55·3%)
26 (6·2%)

The training made clear how my leaders expect me to react when faced with a potential
ethical dilemma on the battleﬁeld

134 (31·8%)
261 (62·0%)

24 (5·7%)

134 (31·8%)

I learned the actions to take if I witness a potential ethical violation

263 (62·3%)
0

50

100

150

200

250

300

Figure: Soldiers’ attitudes toward battleﬁeld-ethics training
N=421.

When the post-training ethical behaviours were
examined, about a ﬁfth of soldiers responded that they had
participated in insulting or cursing at non-combatants,
compared with about a third of those before training;
reports of damaging or destroying private property when it
was not necessary decreased from nearly 14% to 5%, and
reports of witnessing brutality or mistreatment of noncombatants by a unit member decreased from nearly 9%
to 3% (table 3). Signiﬁcant increases were seen in the
willingness of soldiers to report ethical violations (table 3).
The unadjusted univariate logistic regression models
(table 4) showed that a positive screening for PTSD or
depression, spending more than 20 h outside the forward
operating base, and high-intensity combat (on the basis of
www.thelancet.com Vol 378 September 3, 2011

the exposure score) all showed signiﬁcant associations
with mistreatment of non-combatants (ie, unnecessary
damage to property or unnecessarily hitting or kicking
non-combatants). However, when these associations were
adjusted in a model that combined these variables together
with demographics (age, sex, rank, education, and history
of prior deployment), only combat exposure remained a
signiﬁcant predictor of mistreatment of non-combatants.
PTSD, time outside the base-camp, and combat exposure
did predict yelling and cursing at non-combatants,
although combat exposure again greatly attenuated the
strength of these associations in adjusted analyses.
The ﬁgure outlines the soldiers’ attitudes towards the
training programme. Most considered the format to be
921
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eﬀective and nearly two-thirds noted that they learned
what actions to take and understood the eﬀect that ethical
violations can have on a unit’s mission. We did subgroup
analyses to compare the perceptions of training with
PTSD, time outside the operating base, and combat
exposures; no signiﬁcant diﬀerences or trends were
noted in any of these analyses.

Discussion
Results from our assessment of the battleﬁeld-ethics
training programme suggest that soldiers’ behaviours
and attitudes towards the treatment of non-combatants
can be positively inﬂuenced through leader-led training
discussions (panel 2). The conduct of US military
personnel on the battleﬁeld has potential far-reaching
consequences on tactical mission eﬀectiveness and the
strategic success of entire operations with coalition
partners. Two past surveys done during the Iraq
deployment in 2006 and 2007, suggested that 13–14% of
US soldiers reported damaging or destroying private
property and 6% reported hitting or kicking a noncombatant when it was not necessary (table 1).5,6 This type
of behaviour has serious moral and legal ramiﬁcations,
and can damage military relations with local populations
and jeopardise the ability of the US and coalition forces
from other nations to achieve military objectives.
One of the important ﬁndings of our study is that
PTSD was not associated with unethical conduct after
controlling for combat experiences. The intensity of
direct combat seemed to be the strongest predictor of
unethical conduct, which is borne out also by many
anecdotes of combat veterans who describe intense and
sometimes uncontrollable rage in association with
horriﬁc events, such as losing a close team member.22
The soldiers who spent more than 20 h per week outside
the fortiﬁed and protected forward operating bases
averaged a greater number of combat exposures than did
Panel 2: Research in context
Systematic review
We searched both military reports and MEDLINE for reports
published between Jan 1, 1970, and Oct 1, 2007, with the
search terms “military ethics”, “battleﬁeld ethics”, “combat
ethics”, “soldier ethics”, “ethics education”, “ethical training”,
“treatment of non-combatants”, “international humanitarian
law”, “civilian protection in war”, and “combat stress”.
Interpretation
Our ﬁndings have important implications for how military
leaders prepare their forces for military operations ranging
from peacekeeping to combat. Furthermore, unethical
battleﬁeld conduct was associated with high-intensity
combat but not with PTSD, countering a commonly held
belief that PTSD is a cause of such behaviour. Additional
studies are needed to reﬁne, disseminate, and further assess
the eﬀectiveness of battleﬁeld-ethics training.
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those who spent less time outside the base. This group
also interacted more frequently with the civilian
populace, placing them in situations where noncombatant mistreatment could occur. The results suggest
that training in battleﬁeld ethics should be prioritised,
especially for those units expected to engage in highintensity direct combat and who will have the most
interaction with the civilian, non-combatant population.
The degree to which ethical attitudes and reported
behaviours could be modiﬁed through training is an
encouraging ﬁnding. The training was well received by
soldiers. The brief video clips provided a framework for
discussion of topics relevant to the day-to-day scenarios
that these soldiers were encountering, sometimes
including ambiguous and diﬃcult ethical dilemmas. The
chain teaching provided a method for unit leaders to give
guidance on how they expected their subordinates to
respond to ethically challenging situations and also
allowed for direct discussion between participants about
situations they had actually encountered in their work.
Furthermore, the leaders’ personal engagement in the
training emphasised the priority of the topic, and
modelled what was expected throughout the rest of the
deployment. The use of a script ensured that the key
teaching points were delivered consistently across the
diﬀerent leader-led discussions.
Further studies are needed to reﬁne the battleﬁeld-ethics
training methods, improve the sustainability and
reproducibility of the training eﬀects, and establish the
most eﬀective training implementation plans. On the basis
of the initial feedback used in this intervention, we strongly
suggest that future training includes engagement of unit
leaders with their subordinates on these issues. The use of
popular movie clips seemed to be helpful in facilitating
discussion. However, the success of this programme was
probably not related to the speciﬁc vignettes selected, but
rather to the discussion by leaders that led to a cultural
change in which unit awareness of ethical issues and
leadership expectations improved.
An important limitation of this study was the absence
of a randomised or experimental design, which was not
possible in the operational environment, and therefore
the outcomes and conclusions were observational and
dependent on the comparability of the pre-training and
post-training samples. Data from both samples were
gathered from within the same unit with the same
random sampling methods, and with comparable
timeframes of reference. Analysis conﬁrmed that data
for demographics and exposure to direct combat of the
two samples were comparable, which was also
representative of the theatre-wide MHAT survey sample.
Soldiers’ perceptions of training, including the use of
movie vignettes and leader-led discussions, were positive,
with many soldiers attributing improved understanding
of how to handle ethical dilemmas to training.
Soldiers’ attitudes could have changed during deployment because of experience or time in theatre, and not
www.thelancet.com Vol 378 September 3, 2011
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directly because of training. However, previous theatrewide MHAT surveys showed no improvement in ethical
attitudes and behaviour associated with time in theatre.6
Furthermore, the relation between unethical behaviours
and number of combat exposures would suggest an
expected worsening in attitudes and behaviour with
increased time in theatre because of the likelihood of
additional exposure rather than the recorded improvement
in this sample.
Linkage of pre-training and post-training responses for
individual soldiers and control for possible confounding
from temporal changes in responses (eg, improved
attitudes over time as a result of experience in theatre,
independent of training) was not possible because of the
anonymous nature of reporting. However, an additional
post-hoc analysis of all soldiers who completed the
2007 MHAT survey showed that longer time in theatre
was associated with higher rates of unethical behaviours
and reduced willingness to report a team member for
mistreatment of a non-combatant (Col Paul Bliese,
Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, Silver Spring,
MD, USA, personal communication).6 Thus, the
signiﬁcant improvement in outcomes seen between pretraining and post-training assessments in the study
brigade is particularly noteworthy.
Another study limitation is the reliance on selfreported measures and the subjectivity of some of the
questions (eg, which behaviours soldiers perceived as
“necessary” in the combat environment). However, the
consistency and strength of associations across the
various outcome measures supports the conclusion that
the training had a positive eﬀect on both ethical attitudes
and actual behaviours.
Individuals might have underreported misconduct,
avoided participation in the survey out of fear that they
might face disciplinary action if their survey responses
were identiﬁable, or responded in a manner that was
perceived as desirable to the unit leaders and military
environment. However, the anonymous reporting,
precautions to ensure that surveys were not accessible to
unit peers or leaders, and use of questions that focused
on attitudes and somewhat subjective behaviours
probably encouraged honest reporting. Evidence
suggests that soldiers are much more willing to report
sensitive mental-health concerns on anonymous surveys
than in screening surveys used in non-anonymous
conﬁdential clinical settings.23 Furthermore, soldiers’
responses were consistent in this study sample as
compared with previous theatre-wide anonymous
surveys, which used the same questions. The survey
sampling design and protection of soldiers’ identities
with anonymous surveys were identical for the pretraining and post-training groups, and the post-training
survey was administered 3–4 months after training
rather than in close proximity. Therefore, diﬀerences
attributable to social desirability or diﬀerent levels of
concern about anonymity are unlikely.
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Our ﬁnding that battleﬁeld-ethics training with leaderled discussions positively inﬂuenced soldiers’ behaviours
and attitudes towards the treatment of non-combatants
has implications for the conduct of many peacekeeping
and combat operations worldwide. Although battleﬁeld
ethical conduct is judged to be crucial to mission success,
and training is increasingly being included in the
curriculum of military organisations internationally,7,13,24
we are not aware of any other systematic programme
assessment. The results of this study can inform training
programmes worldwide, including a North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) initiative, chartered in 2009,
to develop and implement moral dilemma training for
all NATO forces.25 Our study is the ﬁrst published study
to provide both potential methods for preventing
unethical conduct and associated factors for unethical
battleﬁeld conduct.
Emphasis should be placed on training those with
high levels of combat exposure, and should include
experientially-based leader-led discussions.
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